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This paper develops a model of marital dissolution based on communication difficulties. 
The quality of a marriage depends on the proximity of an action to a target. The target 
is unknown, and must be learned over time. Each individual receives private signals 
about the target, and can communicate them only imperfectly to his or her spouse. Be-
cause of imperfect communication, spouses may hold different beliefs about the optimal 
action. The action actually chosen is a compromise of the spouses’ distinct beliefs. If a 
couple’s beliefs diverge too widely, one or both of them may prefer to dissolve the mar-
riage. The paper explores how poor communication contributes to marital unhappiness, 
as well as its implications for the dynamics of divorce risk, the welfare properties of di-
vorce decisions, and the role of counseling. When the distribution of decision-making 
power in the household favors men, wives (but not husbands) can find themselves 
trapped for prolonged periods in a marriage that leaves them as unhappy as it is possible 
to be without seeking relief through divorce. 
JEL Classifications:  J12, D1, D79, D83. 
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I. Introduction 
The marriage guidance counselor told the couple, “It is essential that husbands 
and wives know the things that are important to each other.” He addressed the 
husband, "Do you know what your wife’s favorite flower is?" “Of course,” the hus-
band replied, “Pillsbury All-Purpose.”  
This paper develops a model of marital dissolution based on communication difficulties. 
The quality of a marriage depends on the proximity of an action, x, to a target θ. The 
target is unknown, and must be learned over time. Each individual receives private sig-
nals about θ, and can communicate them only imperfectly to his or her spouse. Because 
of imperfect communication, spouses may hold different beliefs about the optimal action. 
The action actually chosen is therefore a compromise of the spouses’ distinct beliefs. If a 
couple’s beliefs diverge too widely, one or both of them may prefer to dissolve the mar-
riage.  
The existing economics literature has little to say about communication and divorce. 
Most of the literature on long-term relationships has, since Becker’s [1973, 1974] seminal 
work, been concerned with partnership formation, especially the conditions required for 
assortative matching (see Burdett and Coles [1999] for a review), in a world characterized 
by exogenously heterogeneous match quality. The literature on the dissolution of partner-
ships has grown out of this framework and, as a result, is quite narrow in scope. In stud-
ies that tackle divorce, marriages are either objectively good or bad, relative to outside 
opportunities. There does not seem to be any place in this literature for resolving difficul-
ties in a marriage as an alternative to divorce. Yet this is what we see many couples do-
ing, either on their own or with the help of counseling.  
This paper is intended to fill this gap in the literature by constructing a model in which 
all matches are ex ante identical, and evolving communication difficulties are the only 
source of marital discord. There is extensive evidence pointing toward the central role of 
affective issues, certainly in absolute terms, and likely also relative to economic concerns. 
Wolcott and Hughes [1999: Tables 10 and 11] report that women were six times more 
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likely and men five times more likely to cite affective issues over external (including eco-
nomic) factors as the main reason for divorce. While it is true that income instability and 
other economic variables are known to influence marital stability, the effects seems to be 
relatively small (Gottman [1994]). For example, in an exhaustive meta analysis of 115 
longitudinal studies, the estimated aggregate effect size of “positive behavior” was found 
to be four times that of the positive effect of increasing husband’s income and ten times 
the size of the negative effect of increasing wife’s income (Karney and Bradbury [1995]).1    
Among affective factors, there is also considerable evidence identifying difficulties com-
municating as a major cause of marital failure, whether measured by divorce probability 
or by expressions of distress within the marriage. In a longitudinal study of 40 young 
couples, Storaasli and Markman [1990] found that the quality of communication was, 
along with money, one of the two most important determinants of marital satisfaction 
out of ten considered. Miller et al. [2003] obtained exactly the same ranking of problem 
areas, out of fourteen considered, in a clinical setting of relatively young couples. Whis-
man, Dixon and Johnson [1997] surveyed 500 therapists working with couples, and found 
that communication difficulties was the most commonly presented problem. In a large-
scale longitudinal study, Amato and Rogers [1997] found that reports of communication 
difficulties were a significant predictor of divorce twelve years hence. Communication dif-
ficulties appear to become less important with time, but continue to dog even mid-life 
couples (Levenson, Carstensen and Gottman [1993]; Henry and Miller [2004]). 
A. Main Results 
The model is used to explore the dynamics of disagreement and divorce, to examine the 
welfare properties of private decisions about divorce, and the role of interventions such as 
counseling. The hazard rate of divorce initially rises with marriage tenure before falling to 
zero, consistent with the evidence (inter alia, Wiess and Willis [1997]). The model shows 
                                            
1. Of course, income instability may reduce the prevalence of positive behaviors, so that part of the 
effect size attributed to behavior has income instability as its root cause. Amato [1996] and Karney 
and Bradbury [1995] argue that the effects of many socio-demographic factors are likely mediated 
through behavioral changes, including patterns of communication and conflict.  
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how poor communication contributes to marital instability, and predicts that the hazard 
of divorce increases with the degree of uncertainty about the target and with signal noise 
only when there are communication problems. Some marriages are more difficult than 
others, but only communication difficulties make them untenable. 
The welfare implications of our model depend upon why communication difficulties occur, 
and whether we assume symmetry between spouses. Communication difficulties can arise 
simply because it is difficult to observe and communicate utility functions, and individu-
als know that they observe signals about their spouse’s utility imperfectly. In this case, 
and under symmetry, divorce is always mutually agreeable and it is optimal, both from 
the perspective of social welfare and from the perspective of the welfare of spouses con-
templating divorce.2 Communication difficulties may also arise because individuals are 
solipsistic. That is, they believe their own signals to be more accurate than their spouse’s 
signals. In this case, again under symmetry, we find that divorce decisions are not opti-
mal. Solipsists may be either too quick or too slow to divorce, depending on the form that 
solipsism takes.3 
In practice, however, marriages are unlikely to involve symmetry. In fact the evidence 
suggests that women are better listeners and communicators, they are more likely to be 
able to explain the cause of marital failure, and they are more likely to express concerns 
about the inequitable distribution of decision-making power in the household (Dowling 
and Flint [1990], Hawkins, Weisberg and Ray [1980], Infante and Rancer [1982]). Unsur-
prisingly, married women are usually less happy than their husbands (Komorovsky 
[1964]) and they are much more likely to seek divorce (Brining and Allen [2000]). More-
over, when divorce laws have been altered to allow one partner to leave over the objec-
tions of the other, suicide rates have fallen for women but not men (Stevenson and Wolf-
ers [2006]). We therefore also analyze an asymmetric case in which decisions made by the 
                                            
2. Because the focus of this paper is on the welfare and policy implications of communication diffi-
culties, I assume the matching rate for singles is homogeneous of degree zero in the number of sin-
gle men and women. 
3. The notion of solipsism and the evidence for it will be presented in section II. It is convenient 
therefore also to postpone discussion of the intuition behind this welfare result.  
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household are biased towards the husband’s beliefs about the target. In this setting, the 
wife is the first to select divorce and, because at that time the husband prefers continua-
tion, divorce rates exceed the social optimum.  
In many traditional models, there is a Coasian solution to the inefficiency of divorce un-
der asymmetry, in which one spouse irrevocably transfers wealth to the other to prevent 
divorce (Becker [1973]). An analogy exists in the present model, whereby the husband 
offers to forego part of his control over household decision-making, to compensate his wife 
for foregoing divorce. However, husbands cannot commit to future behavior, and offers to 
alter behavior for the future are time-inconsistent. The best a husband can promise to an 
unhappy wife on the verge of divorce is to keep her, for perhaps a considerable time into 
the future, as miserable as she is today. These are the desperate housewives of the title; 
their only weapon to improve their lot in marriage is to increase the value of divorce by 
inter alia improving employment prospects, opening secret bank accounts, or initiating 
extramarital relationships.4     
The model also provides an explicit productive role for marriage guidance counseling, if it 
is intended to improve communication between spouses. The model predicts that counsel-
ing is more valuable, and hence more likely to be chosen instead of immediate separation, 
for couples with longer marriage duration. The model also predicts that a possibly sizable 
fraction of couples that successfully avoid separation through counseling today will again 
find themselves in crisis at a later stage, and that this is more likely to happen for 
younger couples.   
B. Comparison with Existing Theory 
This paper is intended as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, models with het-
erogeneous match quality. But it is useful to take a moment to compare the two frame-
works. In the traditional model, individuals are distinguished by some observable charac-
teristics that define their type. A marriage is formed to produce public and private goods 
                                            
4. Glass and Wright [1985] report that women are more likely than men to embark upon an extra-
marital affair as a result of marital dissatisfaction, and they are more likely to pursue long-term 
emotional relationships. 
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and services, with output governed by a production function in which productivity de-
pends upon individual types and that exhibits complementarity between types. In both 
frictionless and search models of marriage, this complementarity induces positive assorta-
tive matching. Divorce may arise through any of three mechanisms. First, search for bet-
ter partners may continue during marriage, and divorce is elected when a better match is 
found (Becker, Landes and Michael [1977], Mortensen [1988], Cornelius [2003]). Second, 
types may only be observable with noise, and married partners learn the true quality of 
the match only with the passage of time; they divorce when the perceived quality of the 
match falls below a critical level (Jovanovic [1979], Bougheas and Georgellis [1999]).5 
Third, the quality of the match may change as the result of unanticipated shocks 
(Becker, Landes and Michael [1977], Weiss and Willis [1997]), or purposive investments in 
marriage-specific capital. 6 
The obvious contrast between the traditional framework and the present model is that in 
the latter all individuals and marriages are ex ante identical. Nonetheless, the quality of 
each marriage evolves along a unique path as disparate private signals induce disagree-
ments. Given sufficient time, all disagreements will eventually be resolved; but they are 
long-lived and significant disagreement drives the quality of a marriage below the critical 
threshold that induces divorce.  
The present model therefore blends characteristics of the second and third mechanisms 
for divorce in the traditional model. Not surprisingly, it also shares several predictions 
with these mechanisms.7 Two examples suffice to illustrate. Consider first the hazard of 
divorce. In Jovanovic’s [1979] model of learning about match quality, separation is de-
termined by the first-passage of a standard diffusion process to a single barrier that is 
moving away from the origin as a linear function of time. In the present model, it is gov-
                                            
5. This model was first analyzed formally by Jovanovic in the context of labor markets. 
6. There is of course more to the traditional framework than this précis suggests, and it is not my 
intention to discount this extensive body of work. Thorough reviews can be found in Weiss [1997, 
forthcoming]. 
7. One might view this as a weakness of the present model; however, as these common predictions 
are evident in the data, they are also a constraint that binds on any new theory of divorce. 
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erned by the first passage of a standard diffusion process to either of two linear barriers, 
symmetric around the origin, that are moving away from the origin. These two optimal 
stopping problems yield different distributions of stopping times, but the qualitative 
properties of the corresponding hazard are essentially the same: the hazard rises sharply 
to a unique mode, before declining more gradually, asymptotically approaching zero. 
Second, both models admit reasonable conditions under which positive shocks to a hus-
band’s income reduce the divorce hazard, while positive shocks to the wife’s income raise 
it. This is exactly what the data show (Becker, Landes and Michael [1977], Greenstein 
[1990], Weiss and Willis [1997]). However, the mechanisms in the two models are very 
different. In the traditional model, there is asymmetry between men and women in the 
labor market, with women more likely to specialize in home production, or work part 
time. As a consequence, positive shocks to men’s incomes increase the gains from mar-
riage, while positive shocks to women’s incomes reduce the gains. In the present model, 
positive shocks to either partner’s income make divorce more attractive for them, and less 
attractive for their partner. When the household action favors husbands’ preferences, only 
the wife is near the threshold that makes divorce the preferred option. A positive shock 
to her income may push her over the threshold, while a positive shock to her husband’s 
income moves the threshold further away.8  
There are also distinctions. Traditional models have no obvious role for counseling; the 
present model has nothing to say about sorting. These are, perhaps, not especially impor-
tant distinctions: modest extensions to either model would eliminate the deficiencies.9 
                                            
8. If one were to insist on mutually exclusive theories, these distinct mechanisms behind the effects 
of income shocks generate a discriminating test. The traditional model predicts the indicated effects 
of income shocks should hold only for couples in which the wife has specialized (relatively) in house-
hold production, while the present model predicts it should hold for all marriages.  
9. For example, one can take a broad view of the production function in the traditional model to 
include intangible outputs such as companionship. Counseling may then help couples make mar-
riage-specific investments to increase the output of these intangibles. In the present model, indi-
viduals may be allowed to differ in their ability to communicate, the accuracy of their signals or the 
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However, there is one important phenomenon that the present model does much to ex-
plain, but which is a challenge for the traditional theory: women instigate the majority of 
divorces and separations. For example, in a study of 48,000 cases from four states that 
record the initiator of divorce proceedings, Brinig and Allen [2000] report that the pro-
portion of divorces initiated by women has consistently exceeded 70 percent since no-fault 
divorce was introduced in the late 1960s. In fact, as Figure 1 shows, women have initiated 
the majority of divorce proceedings in the United States at least since the Civil War. 
That they are willing to do so in the face of impending economic hardship, and that they 
are more likely than men to report ex post that divorce was the correct decision strikes 
Brinig and Allen [2000] as a puzzle for traditional economic models. The framework de-
veloped in this paper may provide a solution to this puzzle.         
                                                                                                                       
accuracy of their prior beliefs. There then emerges a complementarity that would induce positive 
sorting along these intangible dimensions.  
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Birnig and Allen [2000] 
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II. The model 
A marriage consists of two individuals, traditionally denoted m and f, who begin cohabi-
tation at time 0. Let uit, i={m,f}, which denotes the flow of utility earned by married 
individual i in period t, satisfy 
 ( )2it t itu xθ ζ= − − + , (1) 
where θ is an unknown target, xt is an action chosen by the couple, and ζit is an individual 
shock. The parameter θ is assumed at time 0 to be a random draw from ( )20,N θσ , while 
the individual shocks are i.i.d draws from ( )2, iN σ0 . Individual i observes uit precisely in 
each period, and observes his or her partner’s utility with noise. It is convenient to as-
sume that i observes ( )( )2jt t jt jtu xθ ζ ε= − − + +  for j i≠ , where ( )2,j jN sε 0∼ . The 
action chosen in each period is of course directly observable, Hence, observation of the 
sequences of payoffs uis and jsu , s =0,1,2, . . ,t−1, is equivalent to having observed t 
normally distributed signals with mean θ and variance 2iσ , and another t independent 
signals with mean θ and variance 2 2j jsσ + . Standard Bayesian formulae for normal conju-
gates then imply that i’s expectation of the target is   
 
( )2
2 2( ) ( 1)
j it jt
it
j j i
y y
E
t
θ
θ
σ γθ γ σ γ σ
+= + + , (2) 
with posterior variance 
 
2 2
2
2 2( 1)
j i
it
j j it
θ
θ
γ σ σσ γ σ γ σ= + + , (3) 
where ( )2 2 2/j j j isγ σ σ= + , and 10tit iy t ττθ ζ−== + ∑ . Given these beliefs, i believes the op-
timal action is ( )itx E θ= . The action actually chosen by the couple is 
( )( ) 1 ( )t t m mt m ftx E Eθ φ θ φ θ= = + − , where the parameters φm and φf=1−φm capture the 
distribution of decision-making power within the household.  
A higher variance, 2iσ , affects the payoffs in two ways. First, it makes it harder for both 
spouses to learn θ, so that actions are likely to be further from optimal and the payoff is 
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reduced. Second, for any given action, a higher variance directly reduces expected utility 
for spouse i, because u is concave. The variance 2iσ  is consequently a measure of the qual-
ity of the marriage. In this paper, it is assumed that 2iσ is known. Assuming instead that 
2
iσ  is initially unknown and must be slowly learned over time lays the foundation for a 
model with heterogeneous marriage quality in the presence of communication difficulties. 
Deviations of the parameters γm and γf from unity measure the extent of communication 
difficulties. It will be immediately clear in what follows that we require 1iγ ≠  for at least 
one of m or f. Otherwise, they would always be in agreement about the optimal action. 
We have in mind a situation in which individuals pay too little attention to their spouses’ 
signals, either because they are difficult to observe, or because spouses choose not to ob-
serve them. However, disagreements will also arise if individuals pay too much attention 
to their spouse, in the sense that they think their spouse’s signals are more accurate than 
they really are. The intuition is simple: i tells j his noisy signal, and j overreacts to it, 
believing it to be accurate (and vice-versa). It’s the “[s]he takes everything I say too lit-
erally” complaint. 
Two remarks are in order here. First, one might imagine that the distribution of decision-
making power within the household would be determined through some bargaining proc-
ess. If so, one might expect φm and φf not to be exogenous parameters, but to depend on 
characteristics of the marriage market yet to be discussed (cf. Manser and Brown [1980], 
McElroy and Horney [1981], Lundberg and Pollack [1993]). This paper abstracts from 
such issues to focus on the mechanics of communication difficulties and marital quality. It 
does seem at this stage, as the profession is only just beginning to grapple with emotion 
and affective issues (e.g. Elster [1998], Loewenstein [2000]), that our standard tools for 
analyzing bargaining would bring little insight. 
Second, spouses presumably must reveal their posterior means to each other in order to 
arrive at a compromise decision. But this revelation also allows each spouse to infer pre-
cisely the other’s private signals. If each spouse efficiently incorporates these signals into 
his or her own beliefs, the revised posterior mean will then be the same for both spouses. 
But then, communication difficulties (as measured by γ) would be neutralized, and dis-
agreement would be impossible. More generally, Aumann [1976] has shown that if the 
posteriors of two Bayesians with common priors are common knowledge, these posteriors 
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must be the same; Geanakoplos and Polemarcharkis [1982] show further that if two 
agents with common priors exchange their efficient posteriors back and forth they will 
arrive at the common knowledge posterior.  
These results leave two ways in which disagreements can persist. First, one can drop the 
efficiency of individuals’ updating algorithms. Second, one can drop the common prior 
assumption. The posterior beliefs given in (2) and (3) are on their face derived by taking 
the first approach. But one can also obtain them from an assumption that follows the 
second. Disagreement arises when individuals believe their own signals to be more accu-
rate than their partner’s. Klepper and Thompson (2006) have called this asymmetric 
treatment of signals solipsism and explored its implications for the formation of new 
firms. Solipsism may arise because individuals overestimate the accuracy of their own 
signals (this case has often been referred to as overconfidence), or underestimate the ac-
curacy of other people’s signals.10 In either type of solipsism, it does not matter that 
spouses observe each other’s posterior beliefs, because they each maintain the assumption 
that their spouse is mistaken. 
A. Equal Partnerships 
To begin, symmetry between spouses is imposed. Let φf=φm=½. Let 2 2 2m f ζσ σ σ= = , so 
that the “quality” of marriage is equal for the two. Let 2 2m fs s= , so that failures of com-
                                            
10. There is a large empirical literature supporting the assumption of overconfidence and, to a 
lesser extent, the more general notion of solipsism. De Bondt and Thaler [1995] have gone so far as 
to claim that “perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are 
overconfident.” Evidence of overconfidence has been reported among diverse professions, including 
entrepreneurs (Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg [1988]) and managers (Russo and Schoemaker [1992]), 
although entrepreneurs exhibit much more overconfidence than managers (Busenitz and Barney 
[1997]). Odean [1998] and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam [1998] cite many other examples, 
and different forms of overconfidence. Our assumption that individuals overweight private informa-
tion relative to “public” information has found support in the laboratory (Anderson and Holt 
[1996]) and among financial analysts (Chen and Jiang [2003]). Their findings are consistent with 
the broader notion that people expect good things (e.g. receiving accurate signals) to happen to 
them more often than they do to others (Weinstein [1980], Kunda [1987]). 
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munication are the same in both directions. Then, m fγ γ γ= =  and 2 2 2mt ft tσ σ σ= = . Let 
( )it it tE θ θ∆ = −  denote i’s disagreement with the joint action. Imposing symmetry in (2) 
yields  
 ( )( )
2
2 2
( 1)
2 ( 1)
it it jty y
t
θ
θ ζ
γ σ
γ σ γσ
−∆ = −+ + . (4) 
The random variables yit and yjt are normally distributed and independent, each with 
(unknown) mean θt and (true) variance 2t ζσ . Thus, ∆it  is normal with mean zero and 
variance 
 ( )
2 4 2
22 2
( 1)
var( )
2 ( 1)
it
t
t
θ ζ
θ ζ
γ σ σ
γ σ γσ
−∆ =
+ +
. (5) 
Because of the imposed symmetry, the disagreements of husband and wife with the joint 
action are related by ft mt∆ = −∆ . In a symmetric equilibrium, the value of the outside 
option will also be the same. Thus, both will elect divorce at the same time, and we can 
consider the evolution of (4) as the stochastic process that governs marriage duration.  
Given the joint decision and beliefs at time t, individual i’s expected utility is 
 ( )2( )it it t itE u E θ θ ζ = − − −    
          ( ) ( )( )2( ) ( )it it it t itE E Eθ θ θ θ ζ = − − + − −    
          ( )2 2 2it it ζσ σ= − + ∆ +  
          
2
2 2
2 21 ( 1) itt
θ
ζ
θ ζ
γσσ γ σ γσ
  = − + − ∆  + + 
. (6) 
The first term reflects the increasing precision of the posterior distribution of the target.  
Because we have assumed a normal prior and normal signals, this term is deterministic 
and monotonically increasing in t. The term 2it∆  is the cost, in terms of foregone ex-
pected utility, of the current disagreement between spouses. It is zero at t=0, but then 
becomes positive before eventually returning to zero asymptotically. The second term is 
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of course stochastic and may rise and fall several times before approaching zero as mar-
riage tenure rises. 
Equation (6) shows that the one-step ahead expectation of utility may rise and fall over 
time with the evolution of disagreements. But it is possible that communication difficul-
ties have an even stronger effect on expectations. At the time of marriage, the belief an 
individual has about utility in some future period t is given by: 
 [ ]0 0( ) ( )i t i itE u E E u=  
           
2
2 2
02 21 ( 1) i it
E
t
θ
ζ
θ ζ
γσσ γ σ γσ
    = − + − ∆   + + 
 
           ( )
2 4 22
2 2
122 2 2 2
( 1)
1
( 1) 2 ( 1)
t
E
t t
θ ζθ
ζ
θ ζ θ ζ
γ σ σγσσ χγ σ γσ γ σ γσ
  −   = − + −   + +  + +
 
       ( )
2 4 22
2
22 2 2 2
( 1)
1
( 1) 2 ( 1)
t
t t
θ ζθ
ζ
θ ζ θ ζ
γ σ σγσσ γ σ γσ γ σ γσ
  − = − + −  + +  + +
. (7) 
When γ=1, so there are no communication problems, every spouse expects next period to 
be better than this period: on average marriages without communication problems im-
prove monotonically. Communication problems eliminate this comforting projection, and 
some spouses, especially those in marriages with poor communication, may from the start 
expect things to get worse before they get better. Recent empirical evidence suggests this 
pessimistic projection is warranted. In longitudinal data spanning 17 years, Stutzer and 
Frey [2003] show that the average self-assessment of happiness declines monotonically for 
a decade after marriage. 
Let v denote the value of being single, k the cost of divorce, and let 2( , ; )tV t v k∆ −  denote 
the value at time t of having a difference of opinion of size 2t∆ . Each spouse faces the 
following optimal stopping problem: 
 
2
2 2 2
2 2( , ; ) max , 1 ( 1)t t
V t v k v k
t
θ
ζ
θ ζ
γσσ γ σ γσ
     ∆ − = − − + − ∆    + + 
 
                                       }2 2 21 1( , 1; ) ( | , )t t tV t v k dF tβ + ++ ∆ + − ∆ ∆∫ . (8) 
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In each period, the spouse may elect divorce and receive the payoff v k− , or continue in 
the marriage. Continuation yields a payoff consisting of two parts. The first is the one-
period utility received from the marriage. The second is the expected value of remaining 
married at the beginning of the next period, with a discount factor of β, and where expec-
tations are taken over the possible values of 2 1t +∆ . The distribution of 2 1t +∆ , 
2 2
1( | , )t tF t+∆ ∆ , depends on the current disagreement size as well as the tenure of mar-
riage.11  
It is shown in the appendix that 2( , ; )tV t v k∆ −  is decreasing in 2t∆ , and this is the key 
result that ensures the solution to (8) is typical of most stopping problems: 
PROPOSITION 1. The optimal stopping problem has a unique solution, 2tD , such that con-
tinuation is optimal if 2 2t tD∆ <  and divorce is chosen whenever 2 2t tD∆ > .   
PROOF. See Appendix. 
In the absence of a divorce option, it is easy to establish that 2( , )tV t∆  is linear in 2t∆ . 
Hence, as a well-known property of optimal stopping problems with compact continuation 
regions, we have the following result: 
PROPOSITION 2. 2( , ; )tV t v∆  is a convex function of 2t∆ . 
PROOF. See Appendix. 
At the boundary of the stopping problem, the reservation equation is (see Appendix) 
      ( )
2
1
2
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1
0
(1 )( ) ( , ) ( , 1; ) ( | , ) 0
tD
t t t t t tv k E u D t V t v k F D t dβ β
+
+ + +∆− − = − ∆ + − ∆ ∆ >∫ , (9) 
where 2 2 1/ 0tV V +∆ = ∂ ∂∆ ≤ . The term (1−β)(v−k) is the annuitized opportunity cost of 
remaining in the marriage. The integral expression on the right is the option value of re-
maining in the marriage, which may yield a smaller disagreement and therefore higher 
                                            
11. The exact distribution is derived in Lemma 1 in the Appendix. 
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utility in the next period. Spouses remain together even though doing so provides a lower 
utility flow than getting divorced, in the hope that the marriage will soon become better. 
To evaluate the outside option, we characterize the market for singles in a very simple 
way. Let (0, 0, )V v  denote the value of a new marriage, and let λ denote the per-period 
utility earned while single. Assume a population of infinitely-lived individuals, evenly di-
vided between men and women. In each period single individuals meet a potential partner 
with probability µ. All potential partners are equally attractive, so every meeting pro-
duces a marriage at the beginning of the next period. Hence, the value of being single is 
( )(0, 0; ) (1 )v V v vλ β µ µ= + + − . For marriage to be attractive to single people, we 
require that (0, 0; )v V v k< −  or, equivalently, that (1 ) (0, 0; )V v kλ β< − − .  
This simple characterization eliminates a key externality found in some previous marriage 
models. In those models, individuals mix randomly without regard to marital status, so 
the probability that a single individual meets another single is increasing in the fraction 
of the population that is unmarried. Increasing returns in the matching function induces a 
market failure because individuals consider divorce without taking into account the con-
tribution that their divorce would make to the welfare of other singles (e.g. Chiappori 
and Weiss [2003]). Although random mixing is a more realistic representation, we will 
maintain our simple characterization of the singles market in order to focus on the conse-
quences of communication difficulties. 
The boundary, 2tD , may rise or fall over time in a way that defeats explicit analysis. On 
the one hand, any given size of disagreement is associated with greater one-period utility 
as t rises. This will cause the size of disagreement necessary to induce divorce to rise over 
time. On the other hand, the option value of remaining in the marriage declines with 
time because the variance of 2 1t+∆  conditional on 2t∆  declines with t. This effect induces a 
decline in the size of disagreement necessary to induce divorce.12 It does not seem to be 
                                            
12. When t is small, the conditional variance of 2 1t+∆  is large, so there are considerable opportuni-
ties to see an improvement in the state variable next period. Hence, the option value of remaining 
in the marriage is greater. But at t rises, it becomes less likely that 2 1t+∆  will be much less than 
2
t∆ . 
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possible to show that one of these effects dominates the other, which creates difficulties 
for studying the hazard of divorce as a function of marriage duration. 
In a related labor turnover model, Jovanovic [1979] offers an approximate solution to the 
hazard problem by fixing the critical value for dissolution of the match to its asymptotic 
value. Adapting Jovanovic’s strategy here requires setting 2 2limt t tD D→∞=  for all t. For 
large t, we have 2 21limt t t→∞ +∆ = ∆ ,13 and the second term on the right hand side of (9) 
becomes 2 2( , 1; )tV D t v kβ ∆− + − 2 2( , ; )tV D t v kβ ∆= − − 0= . The first equality arises because 
there is no further evolution in F, and the second equality is due to the usual smooth-
pasting condition at the boundary. Thus, 2 2lim (1 )( )t tD v kζσ β→∞ = − − − − .  
The approximation strategy therefore requires the distribution of the Markov time, T, 
that satisfies 
 { }2min : (1 )( )T v kτ ζτ τ σ β= ∆ ≥ − − − − . (10) 
This first passage problem is easier to analyze in the continuous-time analog to our prob-
lem (c.f. Cox and Miller [1965]). Define  
 
2 2
2
( 1)
2
( 1)t t
t θ ζ
θ ζ
γ σ γσω γ σ σ
 + +  = ∆  − 
. (11) 
The random variable ωt is normal with zero mean and variance t , while the increments 
to ωt are independent standard normals. The continuous time stochastic process dω(t) 
that gives rise to the same distribution as ωt at t=0,1,2, . . . , is a standard zero-drift 
Wiener process with boundary condition ω(0)=0. 
 Let * 2 (1 )( )v kζσ β∆ = − − − − , and let *( )tω  denote the corresponding absolute value 
of *ω  evaluated at time t. From (11) 
 
* *
*
2 2
2 2 ( 1)
( )
( 1) ( 1)
t
w t
ζ
θ ζ
γσ γ
γ σ γ σ
∆ ∆ += +− −  
                                            
13. Although it should be understood that { }2lim Pr 0 0t t→∞ ∆ > = . 
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         * *1 2tω ω≡ + . (12) 
Equations (11) and (12) define the problem for the first passage of a Wiener process to 
either of two linear boundaries, * *1 2tω ω+  and * *1 2tω ω− − , that are moving away from the 
origin (see Figure 2). This transformation of the problem enables us to exploit some 
known results on first passage times. 
THEOREM 1 (Doob [1949]). Let ( )* *1 2| ,F T ω ω  denote the distribution of first passage times 
for (11) and (12). Then ( ) * * 21 2* * 1 21 2 1lim | , ( 1)n nt nF T e ω ωω ω ∞ + −→∞ == −∑ . 
Theorem 1 gives the probability that a couple ever divorces. The next proposition estab-
lishes that, for any parameter configuration, there is a strictly positive probability that a 
marriage never results in divorce. 
PROPOSITION 3. For any *1 0ω > , *2 0ω > , ( )* *1 2lim | , 1t F T ω ω→∞ < . 
PROOF. Let 
* * 2
1 21 2( 1)n nnx e
ω ω+ −= −  and 1kk nns x== ∑ . We have * *1 221lim nk k ns e ω ω∞ −→∞ =< =∑  
* *
1 22 12( 1)e ω ω −− < ∞ , so the series is absolutely convergent. Note also that 1n nx x+ <  n∀ , 
ω
0 t
a
ω(t)
T
ω ω+* *1 2 t
ω ω− −* *1 2 t
FIGURE 2. The first passage problem for marital dissolution 
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and x1>0. Hence, using a well-known property of alternating series,  ( )* *1 2lim | ,t F T ω ω→∞  
* *
1 22
1 1x e
ω ω−≤ = < .   • 
As 
 
( )2* *
1 2 2 2
2 (1 )( ) ( 1)
( 1)
k v ζ
θ
β σ γ γω ω γ σ
− − − += −  (13) 
and ( )* *1 2lim | ,t F T ω ω→∞  is decreasing in * *1 2ω ω , it is easy to identify factors that raise the 
probability that a marriage ends in divorce. 
PROPOSITION 4. Marriages are more likely to end in divorce (i) the greater the difficulty 
communicating preferences (λ), (ii) the larger the prior uncertainty about the tar-
get 2( )θσ , (iii) the noisier the signals 2( )iσ , (iv) the lower the divorce costs (k), 
and, (v) the greater the value of being single (v).  
These results are intuitive and need no further explanation. However, the likelihood of 
marital failure as a function of γ is of particular interest, and this relationship is plotted 
in Figure 3. No marriage fails if γ=1; the divorce probability rises rapidly as γ moves 
away from unity – whether individuals overreact or under react to their partner’s signals. 
γ1
P
r 
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FIGURE 3. Communication difficulties and the lifetime probability of marital failure. 
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Interestingly, overreacting to signals is more damaging to a marriage than is ignoring 
them. No matter how little attention couples pay to each other’s signals, the lifetime 
probability of marital failure is bounded well below one. In contrast, spouses that con-
sider each other’s signals to be almost perfect will almost certainly divorce. Moreover, 
because both *1 0ω →  and *2 0ω →  as 0γ → , they are likely to divorce very quickly.    
The first passage distribution has only recently been derived: 
THEOREM 2 (Choi and Nam [2003: Theorem 7]). The first passage distribution for 
*
1 0ω > , *2 0ω > , and T>0 is  
( ) 1
1
* *
1 2| , 1 ( )
x
x
F T d sω ω
−
= − Φ∫  
2 3
* * 2
1 2
2 3
2 (2 1)
1
( ) ( )
x x
n
n x x
e d s d sω ω
∞
− −
= − −
     + Φ + Φ      
∫ ∫∑  
                                                                 
4 5
* * 2
1 2
4 5
8 ( ) ( )
x x
n
x x
e d s d sω ω−
− −
    − Φ + Φ       
∫ ∫ , 
where ( )sΦ  is the standard normal distribution., * *1 1 2Tx Tω ω= + , 
* *
2 1 2(3 4 )Tx n Tω ω= − + , * *3 1 2(4 1)Tx n Tω ω= − + , * *4 1 2(1 4 )Tx n Tω ω= − + ,  
and * *5 1 2(1 4 )Tx n Tω ω= + + .  
Obviously, any statements made about ( )* *1 2| ,F T ω ω  can only be supported by numerical 
calculations.14 Figure 4 plots the divorce hazard, ( )( ) ( )/ 1 ( )h T F T F T′= − , for given val-
ues of *1ω  and *2ω . Variations in parameter values have little impact on the shape of the 
hazard, which rises rapidly to a unique maximum, before declining to zero asymptotically. 
Reductions in either *1ω  or *2ω  simply raise the hazard for all t>0. 
PROPOSITION 5. The divorce hazard rises monotonically until some time τ>0. Thereafter 
it declines asymptotically to zero. 
                                            
14. The terms in the summation tend to zero at the rate 
2ne− , so numerical calculations are par-
ticularly accurate. 
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For a wide range of parameter values the peak of the hazard comes quite early in a mar-
riage, so when data are coarse studies may only observe a monotonically declining hazard 
(e.g. Becker, Landes and Michael [1977: Table 3]). But the hazard shape given in the 
proposition has been found in high-frequency data sets. For example, raw survival data 
from the National Survey of Family Growth indicates that the US separation hazard 
peaks sometime in the third year of marriage (Bramlett and Mosher [2001]). Aalen and 
Gjessing [2001] report the same for Norwegian couples. The pattern survives even after 
controlling for numerous marriage-specific characteristics. Conditional on earnings, mar-
riage date, and demographic characteristics, Weiss and Willis [1997] find increasing mar-
riage tenure first raises and then lowers the separation hazard in the US, while Svarer 
[2002] finds the same for Denmark (see Figure 5).15  
Comparative Statics. In considering the effect of parameter changes on the divorce haz-
ard, it is useful to consider two distinct scenarios. The first, and simplest, is to assess the 
effect of parameter changes for a single marriage, taking as given the value of the outside 
                                            
15. Of course, as we know from Jovanovic [1979], this hazard shape is also consistent with models 
in which couples are learning about the quality of a match. 
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FIGURE 4. Divorce hazard; * *1 2 1ω ω= =  
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option v−k. This is equivalent to assuming that parameters are marriage specific, and 
independent across marriages. The second scenario assumes parameters are common to all 
marriages, and requires us to assess the effect of parameter changes in society as a whole.  
In the first scenario the analysis is straightforward and most parameter changes induce an 
unambiguously-signed change in the hazard of divorce: 
PROPOSITION 6. For a single marriage in a static social environment, (i) the hazard of 
divorce is strictly increasing in 2θσ  and (for γ>1) γ,  for all t>0. (ii) there exists a 
0 τ< < ∞  such that the hazard is strictly decreasing [increasing] in 2ζσ  for 
[ ]t τ< > . 
For given v−k, greater prior uncertainty, noisier signals and poorer communication in-
crease the divorce hazard in two ways. First, they increase the hazard of attaining any 
given size of disagreement. Second, they lead to a decline in the value of a marriage even 
conditioning on the disagreement, and hence reduce the size of disagreement necessary to 
0
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FIGURE 5.  Separation hazards in the US and Denmark. US data are from raw life-
table estimates obtained from a 1995 survey of women aged 15-44 years. Source: 
Bramlett and Mosher [2001]. The cycles evident in the US data are due to rounding 
errors in the life tables. Danish data are the baseline hazard obtained from a propor-
tional hazards regression using a sample of individuals followed from 1980 to 1995.. 
Source: Svarer [2002].  
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induce divorce. The time-dependent effects of changes in 2ζσ  are also readily explained. 
On the one hand, an increase in 2ζσ  reduces the expected flow of utility while married, 
because of the concavity of the utility function. On the other hand, it induces both 
spouses to respond less to all signals, reducing the opportunity for disagreement for any 
given sequence of signals. The latter effect dominates for t small (see Figure 6). 
The second scenario is more complicated. For example, as we have just seen the hazard of 
divorce is strictly increasing in 2θσ  for all t when v−k is fixed. However, v is decreasing in 
2
θσ , and this reduces the hazard at any t by raising the size of disagreement necessary to 
induce divorce. For young marriages, the former effect dominates and an increase in 2θσ  
raises the hazard. But as marriage tenure rises, the direct effect of increases in 2θσ  are 
attenuated, while the expected value of becoming single is independent of marriage ten-
ure. Hence, for t large enough, an increase in 2θσ  reduces the divorce hazard. However, it 
is obvious that the following proposition holds: 
PROPOSITION 7. The hazard of divorce is strictly increasing in the common social values 
of  µ and λ, and it is strictly decreasing in k 
0 t
A
B
B
C
C
A
τ
FIGURE 6. Comparative statics. Increases in γ and 2θσ  shift the bounda-
ries in from AA to BB. Increases in 2ζσ  shift AA to CC. The lower 
boundaries (omitted) shift in symmetric fashion. 
 22
Marital Shocks. It is well-established that significant shocks to the structure of family life 
increase the divorce hazard and expressions of dissatisfaction. Some shocks, such as the 
birth of a child, that reduce the hazard of divorce continue to increase expressions of 
marital dissatisfaction, suggesting that discord in the marriage induced by the shock is 
dominated by the event’s effects on the value of the outside option (see Karney and 
Bradbury [1995] for a review).  
The model provides a natural framework to think about the effect of shocks. Such events 
alter the target in possibly unknown ways. Assume that for a couple married at time 0, 
an unanticipated life-changing event occurs at time T. The initial target was a random 
draw, θ, and couples will on average have made some, possibly significant, progress to-
ward learning it. At T, however, the target moves, say from θ to θ+ξ, where ξ is a draw 
from ( )20,N ξσ . The event has two effects. Immediately, it lowers the expected current 
utility from the marriage because the posterior variance over θ rises from 2Tσ  to 2 2T ξσ σ+ . 
This will push couples that were already sufficiently close to divorce over the edge. Sec-
ond, the event alters the future dynamics of disagreement. Increased uncertainty about 
the true target creates new opportunities to disagree that had, for many couples, essen-
tially disappeared. At each point in time, the hazard of divorce remains higher for couples 
that experienced a life-changing event than for those that did not, the gap between the 
two closing only asymptotically.  
Figure 7 illustrates the effect of marital shocks at time T on the first passage problem. 
The boundaries defined by *( )tω  and *( )tω−  are shifted in at T. Some sample paths for 
( )tω  are also illustrated. A couple that found itself at point a at T opts for immediate 
divorce after the shock. Couples that do not divorce at T  nonetheless face increased risk 
after T. For example, a couple arriving at b will divorce even though their marriage 
would have survived absent the shock. Figure 8 illustrates two possible hazard paths. If 
2
ξσ  is small relative to 2Tσ , the initial increase in the hazard is followed by a monotoni-
cally declining path (path A). If 2ξσ  is large relative to 2Tσ , the hazard will rise after T 
before falling again (path B).  
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FIGURE 8. Marital shocks and the divorce hazard. 
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FIGURE 7. Marital shocks and the first passage problem. 
 24
Welfare. Subject to the constraint that a social planner is unable to make individuals 
better observers of their spouse’s signals, divorce in this framework is efficient. First, un-
der symmetry, divorce is always desired by both parties, so there is no aggrieved party 
hurt by one spouse’s decision to dissolve the marriage. Second, our assumption that the 
matching function for singles is homogeneous of degree zero in the number of single men 
and women eliminates any contribution by the newly divorced to the welfare of other 
singles. The social optimality of private divorce decisions will not hold under asymmetry 
(Section II.c) or when spouses are solipsistic (Section II.b). 
Counseling. If you ask therapists what brings a couple to counseling, communication 
problems are cited 87 percent of the time, considerably more than any other problem 
(Whisman, Dixon and Johnson [1997]). But couples seeking counseling typically cite more 
proximate sources of marital distress, such as parenting, financial, or intimacy issues, and 
they rate communication problems as less important than do therapists (Doss, Simpson, 
and Christensen [2004]). Even when communication problems are understood to be a 
source of distress, they are often expressed in terms of disagreements about more specific 
issues. The distinction is consistent with the model. It will shortly be shown that couples 
seek counseling only when they disagree sufficiently (presumably about something). Ther-
apists know that it was communication problems that got the couple to this point.16 
There is an important distinction between counseling that improves communication and 
counseling that addresses proximate sources of distress. The former corresponds to a re-
duction in γ, which not only reduces the size of the current disagreement, it also influ-
ences the future path of ∆ and makes future disagreements less likely. The latter reduces 
the current size of disagreement, but leaves unaffected the future dynamics of ∆. When 
counseling focuses on proximate causes, then, its benefits are more likely to fade with 
time. Empirical evidence appears consistent with this distinction. In a fourth-year follow 
up of couples receiving one of two distinct types of therapies – behavioral therapy (BT), 
                                            
16. This divergence of perceptions about the problem extends to a divergence of perceptions about 
the solution. Therapists use proximate problem solving as a tool to alter behavior. Couples use be-
havioral counseling as a tool to solve a proximate problem. 
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with a relatively greater focus on proximate problem solving, and insight-oriented therapy 
(IOT), with a relatively greater focus on the underlying intrapersonal dynamics -- Snyder, 
Willis and Grady-Fletcher [1991] found that 46 percent of couples that had received BT 
had experienced a significant loss of the short-term gains from counseling, compared with 
less than 10 percent of couples that had received IOT. Jacobson, Schmaling, and Holtz-
worth-Munroe [1987] reported deterioration rates of 10 to 30 percent at one year after 
terminating BT, and 25 to 66 percent after two years. 
Since these studies were conducted, BT has evolved, and other models of counseling de-
veloped, so that couples are today much more likely to receive counseling that addresses 
long-term communication difficulties in addition to resolving proximate causes of distress 
(Gurman and Fraenkel [2002]). Consistent with this evolution, we therefore assume that 
the effect of counseling is to achieve a reduction in γ at cost c.  
Figure 9, which plots some sample paths for the standard Wiener process, w(t), illustrates 
the impact of counseling on a couple. In the absence of counseling, the process passing 
from the origin though points a and b illustrates a sample path, while the lines indicated 
by AB give the thresholds for ω∗(t). Absent counseling, this couple divorces when they 
reach point b. But imagine the couple decides to undergo counseling at time τ. Doing so 
brings about a reduction in γ, which has two effects. First, it allows the couple to reassess 
past signals, thereby bringing about a reduction in the current size of disagreement. The 
resolution of proximate sources of distress shifts the boundaries out to CD. Second, coun-
seling allows couples to process future signals more accurately. This increases the absolute 
slope of the boundaries (see (12)), which rotate outwards to pass through E. The post-
counseling couple experiences a sample path of abcd or abce. If counseling only solved 
proximate problems (i.e. it reduced the size of the current disagreement without reducing 
γ), this couple would divorce at c. But when counseling addresses communication difficul-
ties, the couple would not divorce until they reach d, or they may instead reach a point 
such as e, by which time the risk of divorce at some time in the future has become van-
ishingly small. 
It is easy to verify formally the consequences of therapeutic intervention for marriage 
survival. Because couples receiving counseling are necessarily close to one of the two 
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boundaries, we can with little loss of accuracy consider the first passage problem as one 
involving a single linear boundary. Assume this is the upper boundary, such as is indi-
cated by point a in Figure 9. At a, the couple is a given distance, say x, from the bound-
ary. Let the equation of the linear boundary AB be given by ( )y tα β τ= + − , so that 
x τα= − ∆ . The (defective) density of marriage failure time for any T τ≥  is then given 
by the well-known Bachelier-Lévy formula (e.g. Cox and Miller [1965: p.221]) : 
 ( ) ( )
2
1/23
( ) (( ) ( ))
| , ; , exp
2( )2 ( )
T
f T
TT
τ τ
τ
α α β τα β τ τπ τ
  − ∆ − ∆ + − ∆ = −  −−   
. (14) 
Equation (14) gives the density of the survival time after τ if no counseling is received. 
Counseling that resolves proximate sources of distress without addressing the underlying 
communication problems raises α, say to α′ , but leaves β unchanged. Counseling that 
FIGURE 9. The effect of counseling on divorce risk. 
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addresses the underlying communication difficulties raises both parameters, to α′  and 
β ′ . The following first-order stochastic dominance result holds: 
PROPOSITION 8. Let ( )| , ; ,F T τα β τ ∆ denote the survival distribution. Then for all 
T τ> , ( )| , ;F T α β′ ′ <i ( )| , ;F T α β′ <i ( )| , ;F T α β i . 
PROOF. Differentiating (14), we have (i) when 1αβ > , 0fα <  for all T τ>  ; (ii) when 
1αβ < , 0fα <  for 2 1(1 )Tτ α αβ −< < −  and 0fα >  otherwise; (iii) 0fβ <  for all 
T τ> .     • 
The foregoing discussion simply assumes a couple chooses counseling at time τ. But who 
will choose counseling, and when? The simplest case to analyze is that of perfectly effi-
cient intervention, which reduces γ to one and eliminates all future marital discord. As-
sume that a couple with disagreement 2t∆  undergoes counseling. The expected value of 
the marriage thereafter is  
 ( )2 12 2 2 2
0
( )
1
i
t
i
V c t i cζ θ ζ θ ζ
σ σ σ β σ σβ
∞ −
=
− = − − + + −− ∑ , (15) 
By assumption tV v k> −  for all t, and tV  is clearly increasing in t. Consequently, in a 
choice between divorce or counseling, there exists a T (possibly zero, possibly infinite), 
such that divorce is chosen for t<T, while counseling is chosen for t T≥ . If c is small 
enough17, then T=0; if c is large enough18, then T → ∞ . It is also straightforward to 
show in this case that for t T≥  there exists a critical value, 2 2t tD D≤ , such that counsel-
ing is sought if and only if 2 2t tD∆ ≥  .19  
 
                                            
17. That is, if 
0
( )c V v k< − − . 
18. That is, if { } 2max ( ) /(1 ) ( )
tt
c V v k v kζσ β> − − = − − − − . 
19. Simply replace v−k in (8) with { }max ,
t
v k V c− − . Having already established that V is decreas-
ing in ∆, the usual reservation property holds. 
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PROPOSITION 9. Couples in distress will choose divorce before counseling if the marriage 
duration is short, and counseling before divorce if the marriage duration is long. 
Proposition 9 is in principle testable, but I am not aware of any evidence on the question. 
This is perhaps not so surprising, because an empirical test would be encumbered with 
serious selection problems. First, couples with long marriage duration are less likely to 
have sufficiently severe problems to warrant counseling, so they will be underrepresented 
in samples of couples that are or were married. Second, counseling is more likely to have 
long-term success in older couples, so that in samples of divorced couples those with long 
marriage duration that sought counseling will again be underrepresented. 
B. Solipsistic Spouses 
Solipsistic individuals hold mistaken beliefs about the future evolution of disagreements. 
From equation (A.1) in the Appendix, disagreements evolve according to the linear sto-
chastic difference equation 
 , 1 , 1i t t it t i ta b z+ +∆ = ∆ + , (16) 
where , 1 , 1 , 1i t i t j tz ζ ζ+ + += −  is distributed ( )20, 2N ζσ . However, a solipsistic individual that 
underestimates the precision of his spouse’s signals believes that , 1i tz +  is distributed 
( )20,(1 )N ζγ σ+ , and so he believes that ∆ is more variable than it really is. This solip-
sist’s perceived conditional variance of , 1i t +∆ can be obtained from the true conditional 
variance by a series of mean-preserving spreads. Convexity of the value function then 
implies that for any given size of disagreement, this solipsist’s valuation of marriage ex-
ceeds its true valuation. Let 2tD  denote the disagreement size required to induce divorce 
for this solipsist. Clearly 2 2t tD D> .  
For overconfident solipsists, who overestimate the precision of their own signals, let 
1 2
ζγ σ−  denote the solipsist’s perceived variance of his own signals. This solipsist believes 
that , 1i tz +  is distributed as ( )1 20,( 1)N ζγ σ− + , when the true variance is again 22 ζσ . Con-
sequently, this solipsist’s valuation of marriage is less than its true valuation. If 2tD  de-
notes the critical disagreement for this solipsist, we have 2 2t tD D< . 
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Depending on the form that solipsism takes, solipsistic individuals may be either too 
quick or too slow to divorce. When overconfident solipsists choose divorce, doing so is not 
optimal. When divorce is optimal, solipsists that underestimate the precision of their 
spouse’s signals will delay the decision.  
C. Unequal Partnerships 
Few marriages are symmetric. One partner may have relatively greater difficulties com-
municating signals, or being understood. Even when communication difficulties are sym-
metric, one spouse may enjoy greater autonomy, in the sense that the household decision 
more closely reflects one spouse’s beliefs. In this section, it is assumed that, while the ex-
tent of communication difficulties is equal between spouses, there is asymmetry because 
1
2m fφ φ> > . The assumption that greater weight is put on the husband’s beliefs is not 
arbitrary. The evidence cited in the introduction indicates that women are most likely to 
suffer from an inequitable distribution of decision-making power. At least with respect to 
the division of household chores, there is also some direct evidence on this matter. A sur-
vey assessing perceptions of fairness in the division of household labor produced the fol-
lowing results: for women it lay between “somewhat unfair to me” and “fair to both”; for 
men it was between “fair to both” and “somewhat unfair to my wife.” (Nock and Brinig 
[2002]). 
Asymmetry affects the flow of utility earned in a marriage, and hence the divorce deci-
sion. But if asymmetry is a fact of social life rather than a feature peculiar to the current 
marriage, it also affects the value of being single. If women can expect to have relatively 
less decision-making power in all marriages then not only will the current marriage be less 
attractive, so will future marriages. Unhappiness in the current marriage promotes di-
vorce, while the prospect of future unhappy marriages makes divorce less attractive. One 
should expect, of course, that the former effect dominates in the divorce decision, because 
of discounting, because divorce is followed by a period of time as a single person, and be-
cause new marriages begin with a period of no disagreement. Presuming this to be the 
case, it is convenient to suppress the second effect of asymmetry by assuming that after 
divorce remarriage is not possible. That is, the value of becoming single is independent of 
the degree of asymmetry in marriage. 
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Who Chooses Divorce? It is easy to verify that the wife’s disagreement with the joint 
decision, ∆f, is related to her husband’s disagreement by 1(1 )f m m mφ φ −∆ = − ∆ . Thus, for 
any feasible sample path m∆ , it follows that 2 2, ,f t j m t j+ +∆ ≥ ∆  and ( ) ( )ft t j mt t jE u E u+ +≤  for 
all j, with strict inequality for at least some future time periods. Hence Vf<Vm and, as v 
does not depend on mφ , the wife will choose divorce before the husband.  
Welfare and the Coasian Solution. If φm is fixed, a wife’s decision to divorce is not socially 
optimal, because she fails to take into account her husband’s welfare loss from the di-
vorce. But if the husband can transfer utility to his wife by volunteering to reduce φm, 
divorce can be made efficient. These are standard results understood since Becker [1973].  
It is nevertheless interesting to consider the nature of the conciliatory actions a husband 
will make. The upper panel of Figure 10 provides a sample path of the value function for 
a married woman. As time passes, she experiences a deterioration in the quality of the 
marriage until, at point a, she is no more happy than she was as a single person. But 
given the cost of divorce, she remains married. After further deterioration to time τ, she 
becomes indifferent between marriage and divorce. Up to this point, the husband has had 
no need to accommodate his wife’s increasing unhappiness. But after time t, divorce can 
t
τ
a d
v−k
v
Τ
Vft(t)
φm(t)
t
FIGURE 10. Desperate wives and their minimally conciliatory husbands. 
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be prevented only if the husband surrenders some of his decision-making power. This he 
does (shown in the lower panel of Figure 10); but he does so only to the extent necessary 
to maintain his wife at ftV v k= − . Eventually, a sufficient amount of disagreement is 
resolved so that, by time Τ, the husband has fully reverted to type. Only after this point 
does the wife’s valuation of the marriage begin to rise again. During the interval [ ],Tτ , 
the wife depicted in Figure 10 is one of the desperate wives of the title: she is as miser-
able as it is possible to be in a marriage; she is less happy than a single woman; and she 
knows there is every prospect that this state of affairs will persist for some time to 
come.20 
Income Shocks Under Asymmetry. Becker, Landes and Michael [1977] were the first to 
produce evidence that increases in husbands’ incomes reduce the hazard of divorce, while 
increases in wives’ incomes have the opposite effect. Weiss and Willis [1997] showed that 
these contrary effects of income exist only when the shocks were not predictable at the 
time of marriage. The standard explanation is that they result from an asymmetric divi-
sion of labor in the household: wives are more likely to specialize in non-market produc-
tion (perhaps because only they can bear children; Becker [1973]), so increases in their 
earnings potential are less important within the marriage than it would be upon divorce, 
when they would have to rely entirely on their own income.  
The labor specialization story has attracted its share of criticism because it allows for 
specialization between husband and wife while it assumes away labor specialization 
among women, some of whom would prefer to hire others to do household chores (Brinig 
and Carborne [1988]). Moreover, there has been only a modest decline in the fraction of 
household production undertaken by American women since the 1960s, despite large in-
creases in labor force participation (Blau, Ferber and Winkler [1992], Blau [1998]). Using 
data from the National Survey of Families and Households, Nock and Brinig [2002] point 
out that even today women account for over two-thirds of the hours worked in household 
                                            
20.  A husband will not always save a marriage in this way. If φm falls to ½, at any point in the 
interval [τ,T], then he chooses to divorce instead of making further concessions. 
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production, and this distribution is almost impervious to the amount of work a wife does 
outside the home.  
Income effects can be incorporated in the model in a simple manner by allowing appro-
priable income to enter the one-period payoffs to spouses and single people in an additive 
manner. Then, asymmetry in decision-making authority is sufficient to generate an alter-
native explanation for the contrary impacts of shocks to the incomes of husband and wife. 
Assume that husband and wife earn the same income, and have the same value of being 
single. A positive shock to income has two effects. For the individual whose income rises, 
it makes divorce more attractive. The entire increment to income is available for personal 
consumption when single, but part of it will be appropriated by the spouse in a continu-
ing marriage. In contrast, marriage becomes more attractive to the spouse because it pro-
vides the spouse with a claim over part of the additional income. Then, because a greater 
fraction of wives than husbands are “close” to choosing divorce, a positive shock to the 
husband’s income may induce more women to remain married than it induces husbands 
to choose divorce. For the same reason, a positive shock to the wife’s income may induce 
more women to divorce than it induces men to remain married. This is a possibility, 
rather than a general implication of the model. But it does seem to be a likely outcome 
for modest income shocks if there is a sufficient degree of asymmetry in decision-making 
power.     
By way of illustration, Figure 11 plots the densities of the squared disagreement with the 
joint household decision by husband and wife at time t, each conditional on the couple 
still being married at time t−1.21 The density of 2ft∆  is shifted to the right of the density 
of 2mt∆ , because 2 2 2 2(1 )ft m m mtφ φ −∆ = − ∆  and 12mφ > . Let 2tD  denote the critical threshold 
for divorce, and for simplicity assume it is the same for husband and wife. In the absence 
of shocks to income, all couples for whom 2 2ft tD∆ >  will divorce in period t. An increment 
to one’s own income reduces the size of disagreement necessary for divorce, say to 
2
tD δ− . An increment to one’s spouse’s income raises 2tD  to, say, 2tD δ ′+ . Thus, when a 
                                            
21. It is possible to construct the exact conditional density for 2t∆ , using the concept of the 
Brownian bridge (c.f. Choi and Nam [2003; section 3.2]). However, the result is complicated, and it 
does not eliminate the essential ambiguity illustrated heuristically here. 
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husband’s income rises, an additional percentage of wives, indicated by C+D choose not 
to divorce, while a fraction B of husbands now find divorce attractive. In contrast, an 
increase in the wife’s income induces an additional fraction A+B of women to seek divorce 
while inducing an additional fraction D of men to remain married. Generating the 
observed effects of income shocks requires only that B−D<C. Smoothness of the density 
functions ensures that this must be the case for small enough income shocks.22 
III. Conclusions 
Motivated by extensive empirical evidence that communication difficulties are a pervasive 
source of marital distress and failure, this paper presented a model in which communica-
tion takes center stage. Couples embark upon married life uncertain about the joint deci-
sions they need to make. The optimal decisions are slowly revealed to them through 
noisy, private signals. A notable feature of the model is that uncertainty does not itself 
                                            
22. The reverse can never be true. For a positive shock to the husband’s [wife’s] income to raise 
[lower] the divorce hazard requires that C<B−D<−A, which is impossible. 
FIGURE 11. Densities of squared disagreements at time t, conditional on still 
being married at time t−1. 
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induce marital failure, even though it affects utility during a marriage. Instead, marriages 
suffer distress, and possibly dissolution, because spouses cannot accurately process their 
partner’s private signals. When private signals diverge, spouses also disagree about the 
joint decisions, and some will do so strongly enough to prefer divorce. 
Much of the analysis has been concerned with the mechanics behind the evolution of 
marital distress and the divorce hazard. But the model also offers some insights about the 
welfare properties of divorce decisions, and the effect of interventions such as marital 
therapy. Whether the divorce decision is efficient depends upon the reasons underlying 
communication difficulties and whether the marriage is symmetric. If well-intentioned 
spouses simply have difficulty observing each other’s signals, then under symmetry pri-
vate divorce decisions are optimal. But some individuals, whom we have called solipsists, 
may choose to discount the accuracy of their spouse’s signals or overestimate the accu-
racy of their own signals, even though they could avoid doing so with a little introspec-
tion. For marriages involving solipsists, the divorce decision is not optimal.  
Asymmetry, for example in decision-making power, also induces inefficiency in divorce 
decisions. But in this case, there exists a Coasian solution in which individuals that prefer 
to stay married can compensate their spouses for foregoing divorce by surrendering some 
decision-making power. Empirical evidence favors the assumption that husbands typically 
hold the greater share of decision-making power and they will be the ones required to 
surrender some of it if the marriage becomes distressed. Unfortunately, the best that a 
husband can credibly offer to is to maintain his wife in a situation of desperation: she will 
remain, for possibly an extended period of time, the most miserable that a spouse can be 
and yet not initiate divorce.  
Throughout, it has been assumed that all marriages are ex ante identical. But, of course, 
some marriages that fail result from poor matches that no amount of communication can 
overcome. Some divorces would then arise because of poor matches, while others would 
arise because of poor communication. Combining heterogeneous match quality with com-
munication difficulties in a single model is, of course, feasible, but it seems that doing so 
would provide few insights. One exception is in the role of counseling, which would tend 
to “save” marriages that are worth saving, and encourage divorce in marriages that 
should be dissolved. 
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Appendix 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. To establish that 2( , ; )itV t v k∆ −  is strictly decreasing in 2it∆ , we need 
two lemmas. To simplify notation, we let 2itx = ∆ , 2, 1' i tx += ∆ .  
LEMMA 1. ( ' | ; )F x x t  is decreasing in x for all t and ' 0x > . 
PROOF. Updating (4) by one period and rearranging yields 
 ( )
2 2 2
, 1 , 12 2 2 2
( 1) ( 1)
( 1)( 1) 2 ( 1)( 1)
i t it i t
t
z
t t
θ ζ θ
θ ζ θ ζ
γ σ γσ γ σ
γ σ γσ γ σ γσ+ +
  + + −  ∆ = ∆ +   + + + + + +     
 , (A.1) 
where , 1 , 1 , 1i t i t j tz ζ ζ+ + += −  is distributed ( )20,2N ζσ . Thus, conditional on it∆ , 
( )2 2, 1 1 1,2i t t it tN a bζσ+ + +∆ ∆∼ , where at+1 and bt+1 are respectively the first and second terms in square 
brackets in (A.1). Define ( ) 1, 1 1 , 12i t t i tbζσ −+ + +∆ = ∆ , so that ( )1/ 2, 1 ,1i t t itN λ+∆ ∆ ∼  where 
( ) 11/ 2 1 12t t ta bζλ σ −+ += . Let 2, 1' i tx += ∆ . Its conditional distribution is ( )1(1)' tx xχ λ ∼ ; that is, a 
non-central chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom and location parameter txλ , defined 
by 
 ( ) ( )/ 2 21 2
0
( )
' | ; Pr '
!
x j
j
j
e x
F x x t x
j
λ λ χ
−∞
+
=
= ≤∑    
where ( )21 2Pr 'j xχ + ≤   is the cdf of a (central) chi-square distribution with 1+2j degrees of freedom 
(Johnson, Kotz and Balakrishnan [1995, p. 435]). It is a standard property of the non-central chi-
square distribution that ( )1(1)Pr 'tx xχ λ <    is strictly decreasing in the location parameter for all 
' 0x >  (e.g. Ghosh [1970]). As x x∝   for any fixed t, it follows that ( )' | ;F x x t  is strictly decreasing 
in x for all ' 0x > .  • 
LEMMA 2. Let { }( ', 1) max , ( ) ( ', 1) ( ' | ; )TV x t v k u x V x t dF x x tβ+ = − + +∫  denote the operator de-
fined in (8). ( ', 1)TV x t +  (i) maps bounded continuous functions into bounded continuous 
functions, and (ii) is a contraction mapping.  
PROOF. (i) V is bounded from above by 2 /(1 )ζσ β− −  (a marriage with no disagreement lasting 
forever) and from below by v−k. The conditional distribution F is explicitly defined in Lemma 1 
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and has the Feller property. Hence, if 2( ', 1) , /(1 )V x t v k ζσ β + ∈ − −   and is continuous, 
( ', 1) ( ' | , )V x t dF x x t+∫  has the same property. Then as u(x)<0 and is continuous in x, TV is also 
a bounded continuous function. (ii) Given the properties described in part (i), standard application 
of Blackwell’s Theorem establishes that TV is a contraction mapping.  • 
We can now establish that ( , )V x t  is strictly decreasing in x for all V>v−k. Let ( , )g x t  be a bounded 
function, continuous in x for any t. Let tˆx denote the value of x such that ˆ( , )tg x t =v, and assume 
that g(x,t) is strictly decreasing in x, for tˆx x< . Then  
       { }( ', 1) max , ( ) ( ', 1) ( ' | ; )Tg x t v k u x g x t dF x x tβ+ = − + +∫  
                       ( )
1ˆ
1
0
ˆmax , ( ) ( ) 1 ( | ; ) ( ', 1) ( ' | ; )
tx
tv k u x v k F x x t g x t dF x x tβ β
+
+
   = − + − − + +     ∫ . (A.2) 
Integrating the last term in (A.2) by parts yields 
1ˆ
1 '
0
ˆ( ) ( | ; ) ( ' | ; ) '
tx
t xv k F x x t g F x x t dxβ β ++− − ∫ , 
where ' / 'xg g x= ∂ ∂ , and hence 
 
1ˆ
'
0
( ', 1) max , ( ) ( ', 1) ( ' | ; ) '
tx
xTg x t v k u x v g x t F x x t dxβ β
+   + = − + − +     ∫ . (A.3) 
Differentiating (A.3) with respect to x yields 
     { }
1ˆ
'
0
( ', 1) ( ' | ; ) ' 0, if ( ', 1)
( ', 1)
0, if ( ', 1)
tx
x x xu g x t F x x t dx Tg x t v kd
Tg x t
dx
Tg x t v k
β
+ − + < + > −+ =  + ≤ −
∫
, (A.4) 
where the inequality makes use of Lemma 1. Hence, if ( ', 1)g x t +  is strictly decreasing in x, for 
1tˆx x +< , then ( ', 1)Tg x t +  is strictly decreasing in x, for tˆx x< . By induction, ( ', 1)nT g x t +  is 
also decreasing in x, for tˆx x< . But from Lemma 2 T is a contraction mapping, so 
2lim ( ', 1) ( , ) ( , , )nn itT g x t V x t V t v k→∞ + = ≡ ∆ − . Hence V is decreasing in 2it∆ .  • 
THE RESERVATION EQUATION. When 2 2t tD∆ = , equation (8) implies 
    ( )2 2 2 21 1( ), ( , 1; ) ( | , )t t t t tv k E u D t V t v k dF D tβ + +− = + ∆ + − ∆∫  
   ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1( ), ( ) 1 ( | , ) ( , 1; ) ( | , )t t t t t t tE u D t v k F D D t V t v k dF D tβ β+ + += + − − + ∆ + − ∆∫ . 
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Integrating by parts, 
 ( )2 2 2 2 2 21 1 1(1 )( ) ( ), ( | , ) ( | , ) ( )t t t t t t tv k E u D t F D D t V D D t F Dβ β β+ + +− − = − +  
                                                    
2
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2
2 2 2 2
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                              ( )
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2
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1
0
( ), ( , 1; ) ( | , )
tD
t t t t t tE u D t V t v k F D t dβ
+
+ + +∆= − ∆ + − ∆ ∆∫ , 
where use was made of the fact that 2( )tV v k∆ = −  for all 2 2t tD∆ ≥ .     • 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. It is only necessary to establish that the value function is linear in 2t∆  
when divorce is not an option. In this case the value function is 
    
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 12 2( , ) 1 ( , 1) ( | , )( 1)t t t t t
W t W t dF t
t
θ
ζ
θ ζ
γσσ βγ σ γσ + +
  ∆ = − + − ∆ + ∆ + ∆ ∆  + +  ∫ . (A.5) 
Assume 2 2( , )t t t tW t A B∆ = + ∆  for some sequence { },t tA B . Substituting the proposed solution into 
(A.5) yields 
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2 2 2 2 2
1 1 12 21 | ,( 1)t t t t t t t t
A B A B E t
t
θ
ζ
θ ζ
γσσ β βγ σ γσ + + +
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. (A.6) 
From (A.1), 
       ( )
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( 1)( 1) 2 ( 1)( 1)
t t t
t
E t
t t
θ ζ θ
ζ
θ ζ θ ζ
γ σ γσ γ σσγ σ γσ γ σ γσ+
  + + −    ∆ ∆ = ∆ +        + + + + + +   
. (A.7) 
Substituting (A.7) into (A.6) and collecting terms yields a pair of difference equations in the un-
known coefficients: 
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        ( )
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. (A.9) 
The coefficients on 1tB +  in (A.8) and on 1tA +  in (A.9) lie in the interval (0,1)  so that the solu-
tions to the difference equations in (A.8) and (A.9) are unique and well-defined as long as the 
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boundary conditions are finite. Now 1limt t tB B→∞ + = , and (A.8) yields lim 1/(1 )t tB β→∞ = − . 
Similarly, taking the limit in (A.9) yields 2lim /(1 )t tA ζσ β→∞ = − − . As the solutions are well-
defined, it has been established that 2( , )tW t∆  is linear in 2t∆ . But if W is linear, then 2( , )tV t∆  is 
convex, as this is a standard property of optimal stopping problems.    • 
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